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INTERNET CONTACTS AND FORUM NOTICE: A FORMULA
FOR PERSONAL JURISDICTION
A federal judge in Massachusetts recently referred to the
Internet as the "Wild West."' Instead of wide open land with
little law and few persons to enforce it, the Internet is a figment
of electronic invention that pervades American life but physical-
ly exists in no particular place.2 The vigilante justice imposed
by some Internet user groups and new legal doctrines proposed
by others makes the court's Wild West analogy fitting.3 But self-
governance and novel, untested legal doctrines will not ade-
quately support this important new segment of society.
Recent research indicates that eighty-two million computers
are linked to the Internet.4 Like many new territories, the driv-
ing force behind the Internet's popularity may be its commercial
potential. American businesses are investing large sums of mon-
ey in the Internet,5 in return for access to a marketplace expect-
ed to grow to $220 billion by the year 2001L
1. See Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 463 (D.
Mass. 1997).
2. See id. at 462
3. See William S. Byassee, Jurisdiction of Cyberspace: Applying Real World Prece-
dent to the Virtual Community, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 197, 219 (1995) (comment-
ing on the jurisdictional autonomy of cyberspace and the resulting quasi-governmen-
tal attributes of on-line communities). Other commentators have suggested that the
new world of cyberspace should create its own law and legal institutions. See David
R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996).
4. See The Internet Census, PC MAG., Oct. 21, 1997, at 10. This number may
grow to 268 million by 2022. See id.
5. See Brian Washburn, The Web Gold Rush: New Applications and Techniques,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, June 1996, at 35, 42 (estimating that businesses are investing
from $300,000 to $1,000,000 for large scale promotional web sites).
6. See John Evan Frook, DC Sees Commerce Boom, COMMUNICATIONS WEEK,
July 28, 1997, at 8, available in 1997 WL 12652811 (reporting a company's estima-
tion that the dollar volume of Internet transactions will grow from $2.6 billion in
1996 to $220 billion by 2001); see also Nick Wreden, E-Commerce Goes From EDI to
Extranets: VAR 500 Companies are Wiring Themselves and Their Customers Together,
VARBUsINESS, Aug. 15, 1977, at 110, available in 1997 WL 7700029 (reporting an
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:557
With the increase in Internet activity, courts now must apply
existing law to the unique aspects of Internet-based disputes.
Defendants that challenge a court's exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion based on Internet or computer contacts present some of the
most intriguing legal issues.7 The law governing this issue is,
however, in its infancy.'
In 1996 the Sixth Circuit overturned a lower court's ruling
and allowed Ohio to assert personal jurisdiction over a Texas
defendant In two other cases, separate district courts issued
conflicting opinions on the reach of a state's jurisdiction based
on Internet contacts.'1 Frustration with the ambiguous state of
the law led one judge to appeal for a legislative solution." Ab-
estimate by a market research organization that roughly 17% of commercial transac-
tions will occur over the Internet by 1998 and that 42% of companies will imple-
ment Internet commerce systems).
7. See, e.g., CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir.), reh'g denied
1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 24796 (6th Cir. Sept. 19, 1996) (involving a trademark dis-
pute between a Texas resident and an Ohio-based Internet service provider resulting
from agreements accomplished through the Internet); Panavision Intl, L.P. v.
Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (involving a trademark infringement suit
between a California-based corporation and an Illinois resident over an Internet do-
main name); Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996),
affd, 1997 WL 560048 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1997) (deciding a personal jurisdiction dis-
pute between a Missouri night club and a New York jazz club over an alleged trade-
mark infringement occurring on the Internet); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.,
937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996) (involving a trademark infringement suit over
Internet "domain names" between a Massachusetts corporation and a Connecticut
corporation); PLUS Sys., Inc. v. New England Network, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 111 (D.
Colo. 1992) (involving a contract dispute between a Colorado ATM network and a
regional ATM service provider incorporated in Connecticut); Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System
One, Direct Access, Inc., 636 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (finding a lack
of personal jurisdiction in a breach of contract suit between a New York travel agen-
cy and a Florida-based computer reservation system despite the significant computer-
based contacts between the two parties).
8. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (W.D. Pa.
1997).
9. See CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1257.
10. Compare Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 301 (holding that creating an Internet site
is not an act purposefully directed towards a forum state and is not enough on its
own to justify the exercise of jurisdiction), with Inset Systems, 937 F. Supp. at 165
(holding that an Internet site used for advertisements is directed towards all fora
and is enough to subject the site provider to jurisdiction in any state).
11. See Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 WL 97097, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997) (noting the call for legislation from various commentators
and expressing concern about attempting to analogize non-Internet case law in the
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sent a bright-line solution such as legislation, the danger of am-
biguity lies in the over-expansion of state jurisdiction that could
shatter the long-standing limits on state judicial power. 2
For more than fifty years, the judiciary has attempted to define
the reach of personal jurisdiction to accommodate an increasingly
national and mobile society. 3 With the advent of planes, trains,
and automobiles, the significance of state lines faded. Now, these
boundaries are even less relevant with the increased use of tele-
phones, fax machines, and the Internet for routine personal and
business activities. But reduced practical significance does not
necessarily lead to decreased legal significance.'4
Without further definition, doctrines of personal jurisdiction
that seemed appropriate for a more mobile society may not be
appropriate for a society that often interacts in complete igno-
rance of territorial boundaries. The lack of definition in these doc-
trines threatens unbounded state jurisdiction over anyone using
the Internet. 5 In other words, an Internet explosion could de-
stroy the long-standing boundaries of personal jurisdiction and
the wisdom that maintained them.
This Note demonstrates that an expansive interpretation of
state jurisdictional power based on Internet contacts threatens
absence of legislation).
12. See Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610,
611-12 (1988) (complaining that hybrid personal jurisdiction analysis is inconsistent
with the original usage of specific and general jurisdiction doctrines and results in
unacceptable ambiguity).
13. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
[A] trend is clearly discernible toward expanding the permissible scope of
state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents....
[Ilncreasing nationalization of commerce has [brought] a great increase in
the amount of business conducted by mail across state lines. At the same
time modern transportation and communication have made it much less
burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a [foreign] State.
Id. at 222-23.
14. Both personal jurisdiction of a state's courts and state law impact the legal
ramifications of these routine activities. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL
PROCEDURE §§ 3.4, 3.5, 3.7, at 100-06, 108-11 (1993) (discussing the development, by
state courts, of jurisdictional fictions -as a means of preserving their jurisdiction as
activities become increasingly national in scale).
15. See Inset Systems, 937 F. Supp. at 165 (concluding that Internet advertising
activities are directed toward all states and give rise to personal jurisdiction under a
minimum contacts analysis).
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the historical purpose of personal jurisdiction. The method of
defeating this threat lies not in a judicial or even legislative
overhaul of the doctrine of personal jurisdiction, but in a simple
refinement to a single element in the specific jurisdiction analy-
ses. The Note first summarizes the relevant aspects of personal
jurisdiction development and then analyzes the role of forum
notice in the "purposeful" element of specific jurisdiction. A de-
scription of the Internet's unique qualities will highlight the
challenges it presents to personal jurisdiction. This Note will
then compare Internet contacts with other geographically unde-
fined contacts already addressed by the judiciary. Next the Note
presents an in-depth analysis of emerging judicial opinions as
they relate to personal jurisdiction based on Internet contacts.
Finally, the Note explains why forum notice must be an explicit
element in the judicial analysis of challenges to personal juris-
diction based on geographically blind contacts.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
The power that one state held over a sister state's citizen
within the same federal union was an issue uniquely created
with the United States." Prior to the birth of the United
States, the Law of Nations governed judicial relations between
sovereignties and their respective citizens.'7 Completely inde-
pendent sovereigns composed that model to meet their needs but
not those of a federal union.
The Framers of the Constitution were aware of this gap in the
common law and inserted the Full Faith and Credit Clause to
ensure a closer relationship between state judiciaries in order to
reflect the tighter bond existing between states.' A plain
meaning interpretation of that clause requires every state to
give full effect to any sister state's judgment. 9 But courts never
16. See Roger H. Transgrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal Jurisdiction,
57 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 849, 850 (1989) (discussing the original problem of state
power over another state's citizens).
17. See id. at 858 (stating that the Law of Nations was in part, an outgrowth of
natural law and not positive law enacted by a sovereign).
18. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1. "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State
to the . . . judicial Proceedings of every other State." Id.
19. See Transgrud, supra note 16, at 859.
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fully accepted this interpretation." Despite the recognition of
federal authority over personal jurisdiction, early courts con-
strued a limitation upon the Full Faith and Credit Clause that
the Constitution did not plainly express.2'
Historically, courts granted full faith and credit only to judg-
ments rendered pursuant to the proper exercise of personal
jurisdiction.' Both state and federal courts recognized this lim-
itation.' Because federal courts interpreted the Full Faith and
Credit Clause to be limited in this manner, establishment of
personal jurisdiction seemed to be a common law exception to
the Full Faith and Credit Clause with its foundation in earliest
America.' This exception preserved state sovereignty and the
coincident individual rights.
Personal jurisdiction prevailed as a prerequisite to the grant
of full faith and credit because of the important state and indi-
vidual interests in limiting the reach of judicial authority. Jus-
tice Johnson's dissent in Mills v. Duryee' captured early con-
cerns about state power over foreign citizens:
Instead of promoting then the object of the constitution by
removing all cause for state jealousies, nothing could tend
more to enforce [state rivalry over judicial power] ... . But if
the states are at liberty to pass the most absurd laws... and
we admit of a course of pleading which puts it out of our
power to prevent the execution of judgments obtained under
those laws, certainly an effect will be given to [the Full Faith
and Credit Clause] in direct hostility with the object of it.2"
20. See id.
21. See id. at 861.
22. See id. at 862.
23. See id. (stating that "[vlirtually all state and federal courts agreed before and
after Mills v. Duryee that... state and federal courts had to give effect to the
judgments of sister states only when those judgments had been rendered by courts
with jurisdiction over the defendant").
24. See generally id. at 853-54 ("Under English common law during the American
colonial period, foreign judgments were given effect by English courts only if ren-
dered with jurisdiction over the parties as defined by the English view of proper
rules of international jurisdiction.").
25. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813).
26. Id. at 486-87.
1998]
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Concerns about overextensions of state judicial power did not
end with suspicions of a state's legislature passing absurd laws.
Early courts also expressed concern regarding the potential for
fraud and oppression of nonresident defendantsY
In the landmark case Pennoyer v. Neff," Oregon exercised
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant via a statute
allowing service by publication." Mr. Neff never saw the notice,
and the court entered a default judgment against him and in
favor of his former attorney who claimed unpaid attorney's
fees.30 Unfortunately for Mr. Neff, he held title to a valuable
piece of real estate in Oregon."1 His former attorney executed
the judgment against the property and purchased it at a sheriffs
sale.32 The attorney later sold it to Mr. Pennoyer, presumably
at a hefty profit.33 The attorney thus received- payment for his
fees with money left over to compensate him for his troubles.
This legal manipulation prompted the Supreme Court to decree
that overly liberal means of acquiring jurisdiction over absent
defendants could not be tolerated because they "would be the
constant instruments of fraud and oppression."'
The potential for fraud and oppression through the abuse of
personal jurisdiction continues to concern the courts. 5 Poten-
tial abuse taints even personal jurisdiction obtained through the
time honored means of serving process while in the jurisdic-
tion. 6 Courts more recently have refuted a state's exercise of
personal jurisdiction based on personal service that was predi-
27. See generally Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 726 (1877) (expressing concern
about protecting absent defendants from potential fraud and oppression).
28. Id.
29. See id. at 720.
30. See id. at 719-20.
31. See id. at 715-16.
32. See id. at 716.
33. See id at 719 (stating that the judgment against Neff was less than $300
although the value of the land was alleged to be $15,000).
34. Id. at 726.
35. See generally Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (applying a
jurisdictional standard that subjects nonresident defendants to personal jurisdiction
due to their physical presence- within the forum during service of process).
36. See id. at 610 (stating that "[almong the most firmly established principles of
personal jurisdiction in American tradition is that the courts of a [sitate have juris-
diction over nonresidents who are physically present in the [sitate").
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cated upon sham inducements into a state." By reducing the
fear of interjurisdictional travel, the law increases the opportu-
nity for face-to-face settlement of potential litigation.'s The
plight of unwary defendants and increased judicial efficiency
thus supports the judicial stand against sham inducements.
Any comfort provided by a few bright-line rules such as those
proscribing fraudulent inducement into a forum, however, fails
to overcome the confusing nature of today's doctrine of personal
jurisdiction. Many states have limited legislatively the reach of
their jurisdiction through long-arm statutes, but this Note ad-
dresses only the federal limitations that apply to all courts."o
The federal doctrine is tangled between the Constitution, his-
torical common law practices, notions of traditional fairness,
and modern attempts to accommodate technological advanc-
es. ' The result aimed by the Supreme Court is a primarily
37. See, e.g., Wyman v. Newhouse, 93 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1937) (invalidating service
upon a defendant because the plaintiff, a jilted lover, fraudulently induced the defen-
dant into the jurisdiction to facilitate personal service); E/M Lubricants, Inc. v.
Microfral, SAR.L., 91 F.R.D. 235 (N.D. IMI. 1981) (finding grounds for dismissal
when a sham invitation to negotiate a settlement to a long-running dispute induced
the defendant into the jurisdiction to facilitate personal service).
38. See ElM Lubricants, 91 F.R.D. at 238.
39. These statutes are often the determining factor in personal jurisdiction dis-
putes as demonstrated by the Second Circuit's 1997 decision resolving personal juris-
diction dispute based on Internet contacts. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King,
1997 WL 560048 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1997).
40. See, e.g., U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 1 (requiring that each state give full faith
and credit to the judgments of other states); Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03 & n.10 (1982) (determining
that personal jurisdiction is grounded in the Due Process Clause and is exclusively
an individual liberty interest); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 291 (1980) (noting the common law practice of refusing to grant full faith and
credit to another state's judgment if the state violated due process, including the
improper exercise of personal jurisdiction); id. at 308-09 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(discussing that the increased mobility of society changed earlier models of personal
jurisdiction and arguing for a more expansive reach of the forum state's jurisdiction);
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (stating that the
maintenance of a suit must not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substan-
tial justice" (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940))). Scholars still ar-
gue about the origins of the requirement. See, eg., Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of
the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and
Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19 (1990); John B. Oakley, The Pitfalls of 'Hit
and Run" History: A Critique of Professor Borchers's 'Limited View' of Pennoyer v.
Neff, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 591 (1995); Wendy Collins Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and
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two-pronged approach-general jurisdiction analysis and specif-
ic jurisdictional analysis.41
The analysis required under both prongs evidences historical
concerns about boundless state authority and potential oppres-
sion of defendants. Specific jurisdiction, first introduced in Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington,42 requires an evaluation of a
party's contacts with the forum state to determine whether the
exercise of jurisdiction would violate the individual's due process
rights.' "Traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice"' applied in specific jurisdiction analysis, mandate that a
court consider the defendant's burden before granting jurisdic-
tion.45 Specific jurisdiction thus appears most closely to reflect
a defendant's personal interests.
General jurisdiction finds its justification in a state's territori-
al power triggered by constructive presence that is evidenced
through the maintenance of continuous and systematic contacts
with the jurisdiction.' The recent reaffirmation of transient ju-
risdiction also embraces territorial power accepted at the time of
the Constitution's ratification.47 General and transient jurisdic-
tion thus continue to protect an individual state's interest in
controlling persons within their borders.
The debate over the constitutional basis for these jurisdiction-
al tests, and whether one even exists, are topics beyond the
scope of this Note. Instead, this Note will analyze briefly the
legitimate purposes supporting personal jurisdiction in order to
Substantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH.
L. REV. 479 (1987); Twitchell, supra note 12, at 610. See generally Terry S. Kogan,
A Neo-Federalist Tale of Personal Jurisdiction, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 257 (1990) (trac-
ing the development of the personal jurisdiction doctrine as interpreted by the Su-
preme Court throughout the nation's history).
41. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 14, § 3.10, at 123-24.
42. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
43. See id.
44. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
45. See generally Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (finding a
valid exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant pursuant to
Florida's long-arm statute and due to the defendant's contacts with Florida).
46. See Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
47. See generally Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (holding that
personal jurisdiction is consistent with due process if the nonresident defendant is
physically in the forum when served process).
[Vol. 39:557564
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evaluate how these doctrines can best fulfill the reasons for lim-
iting personal jurisdiction in the Internet context.
Specific Jurisdiction
Specific jurisdiction relies on an analysis of the contacts be-
tween a party and a particular forum."s The contacts must be
sufficient to ensure that the exercise of jurisdiction would not
violate the "fair and orderly administration of the laws" under
the Due Process Clause."9 The cornerstone of the due process
analysis is that the defendant party must maintain contacts,
ties, or relations with the state sufficient to exercise personal
jurisdiction fairly." The presumption that the party enjoying
the benefits and protections of a given state should bear obliga-
tions arising from access to those benefits and protections justi-
fies the minimum contacts analysis.51 A state therefore cannot
impose upon the liberty of an individual without his implicit
consent. Further reinforcing these interests, courts may not
allow the exercise of jurisdiction if the burden on the defendant
outweighs the state's interest.52
Maintaining the proper balance between the right of states to
assert jurisdiction and the integrity of individual rights is a deli-
cate task. In order to strike a proper balance, courts have re-
stricted the reach of specific jurisdiction to defendants having
minimal, purposeful contacts with the forum that result in the
cause of action.53 Requiring the contacts to be purposeful pre-
serves the right to be free from exorbitant theories of jurisdic-
tion while accommodating a mobile society.5
48. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
49. Id. at 316.
50. See id. at 317.
51. See id. at 318.
52. See generally Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987)
(asserting that the burdens on the foreign defendant outweighed the interests of the
plaintiff and forum state invalidating personal jurisdiction over the defendant).
53. See generally FRIEDEN'HAL ET AL., supra note 14, §§ 3.10-.11, at 120-38 (dis-
cussing the rule of International Shoe and analysis under that rule). There must be
some purposeful act by the defendant to support jurisdiction under the minimum
contacts test. See id. § 3.11, at 129. Even sporadic contacts with the forum may give
rise to specific.jurisdiction if the cause of action arises from the contact. See id. §
3.10, at 124.
54. See generally Twitchell, supra note 12, at 615 (asserting that pre-nineteenth
1998] 565
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Because purposeful contacts are the touchstone of specific ju-
risdiction, any analysis must define "purposeful." Foreseeability
is a significant part of the formula that the courts use to define
purposeful contacts, but the courts require a specific type of fore-
seeability.' It is the defendant's ability to foresee being haled
into court within the jurisdiction, not the mere foresight of possi-
ble contact. The defendant who purposefully avails himself of a
forum state must be on notice that he is subject to suit in that
state." This standard is distinguished from the mere
foreseeability of possible contact with a forum state that was
described in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.57
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme Court rejected juris-
diction over an automobile retailer and wholesaler based in a
foreign state." The plaintiffs purchased the automobile in New
York, later suffered injuries due to an automobile accident in
Oklahoma, and instituted a tort action against the seller in
Oklahoma.59 The Court conceded that the seller might have
foreseen a purchaser driving an automobile into the State of
Oklahoma.' The Court concluded, however, that the unilateral
activity of a plaintiff claiming a relationship with a defendant is
insufficient to constitute a purposeful contact with the foreign
state.6' Such an attenuated relationship does not put the defen-
dant on adequate notice that he may be haled into court there.
Expanding on this theme, the Court ruled that deliberately
placing products into the stream of commerce that later entered
a forum, even if the entry was foreseeable, did not constitute a
sufficient contact.62 Requiring purposeful action by a party re-
century courts found territorial jurisdiction generally adequate because parties could
usually be found where the dispute arose).
55. "[Tlhe foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis... is that the
defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 287 (1980).
56. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
57. 444 U.S. 286, 287 (1980).
58. See id.
59. See id. at 286.
60. See id. at 287.
61. See id. at 298 (citing Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253).
62. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987). Jus-
tice O'Connor stated that the contact must be "an action of the defendant purpose-
[Vol. 39:557566
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stricts the forum from asserting jurisdiction over hapless defen-
dants that do not deliberately benefit from the jurisdiction.
From the Court's analysis of purposeful contacts, it is evident
that the defendant must be aware of his contact with the forum.
The benchmark of awareness is not the mere foreseeability of
potential contact, but the real possibility of being haled into
court in the particular forum. Merely entering products into the
stream of commerce or a plaintiff's unilateral action, absent de-
liberate contact by the defendant, does not put the defendant on
sufficient notice.' These limits can be characterized, therefore,
as requirements that defendants undertake sufficient, knowing,
affirmative acts resulting in the contact with the state.
Unsatisfied with these structural limits on specific jurisdiction,
the Supreme Court in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz required
additionally an analysis of the fundamental fairness of the juris-
dictional exercise.' The purpose of this analysis is to prevent
grave inconvenience to a party despite the purposeful availment
of the forum.'s This limitation prevents undue burden on the
defendant. The decision in Burger King represented the first time
that the Court considered the defendant's interests despite other-
wise legitimate affiliation with the forum, thus introducing an ad-
ditional limitation on the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Unlike
the label "traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice" 7 implies, this test does not have historical roots as deep as
territorial power-based theories." Its purpose does not relate to
the integrity of the sovereign.69 The reason for this limitation is
fully directed toward the forum State" and not merely foreseeable. Id, (emphasis
omitted).
63. See id.
64. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
65. See id. 477-78 (stating that "requirements inherent in the concept of Tfair play
and substantial justice' may defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction even if the de-
fendant has purposefully engaged in forum activities").
66. See id. at 478.
67. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
68. See id. at 325 (Black, J., concurring). "There is a strong emotional appeal in
the words 'fair play,' justice,' and 'reasonableness.' But they were not chosen by
those who wrote the original Constitution or the Fourteenth Amendment. . . ." Id.
69. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 14, § 3.11, at 129-30. The Supreme Court
has deemphasized the interests of the forum state and plaintiff in the due process
1998] 567
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purely the interest of the defendant party, which is now firmly
established as a required consideration prior to the exercise of
jurisdiction." Consideration of the defendant's interests raises
the hurdle required for jurisdictional exercise, while only slightly
undercutting state interests in territorial power.
Specific jurisdiction and the minimum contacts analysis was
introduced first in the 1940s.71 In contrast to territorial-based
power, specific jurisdiction has provided courts with flexibility to
resolve some of the more ambiguous questions presented in per-
sonal jurisdiction controversies. 2 Courts are able to focus their
inquiry on the individual's actions related to the forum rather
than the increasingly elusive concept of presence. These abilities
make the doctrine well-suited for Internet-related controversies.
General Jurisdiction
General jurisdiction, a relatively new term in the jurisdiction-
al debate, boasts a heritage as old as any doctrine of personal
jurisdiction-territorial power based on presence.73 Unlike spe-
cific jurisdiction, which requires that the dispute arise out of the
forum contact, general jurisdiction is blind to the contacts giving
rise to the dispute. 4 The exercise of general jurisdiction neces-
sitates only presence in the state that is defined as continuous
and systematic contacts. 5
The Supreme Court employed the general jurisdiction analysis
explicitly for the first and only time in a 1984 decision:
Helicopteros Nacionales De Columbia, SA. v. Hall.76 The plain-
tiffs attempted to assert jurisdiction over a foreign corporation
analysis that underlies specific jurisdiction. See id, at 129. Convenience to the defen-
dant, although a consideration, is, however, secondary to the minimum contacts anal-
ysis. See id. at 129-30.
70. See id. at 129.
71. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
72. See infra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
73. See generally Twitchell, supra note 12, at 615 (stating that pre-twentieth cen-
tury courts 'justified jurisdiction solely upon general jurisdiction criteria").
74. See generally id. at 627 (stating that specific jurisdiction is "dispute specific"
and general jurisdiction is "dispute blind").
75. See Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S.L v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415-16
(1984).
76. See id. at 414.
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INTERNET CONTACTS AND FORUM NOTICE
based on significant contractual affiliations including helicop-
ter purchases, personnel training, executive level negotia-
tions, and financial transactions occurring within the state
of Texas." The Court's opinion referenced an earlier case,
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,7" in which it
stated that the defendant satisfied the requirements of gen-
eral jurisdiction.79  In Perkins, extensive contacts existed
between the defendant and the state including: holding
board meetings in the state; maintaining corporate files in
the state; maintaining accounts at state banks; and super-
vising corporate policies within the forum."0 In other words,
the defendant maintained substantial, continuous, and sys-
tematic business activities in the state. Despite the signifi-
cant contacts demonstrated in Helicopteros, the Court reject-
ed Texas's exercise of jurisdiction."' The Court defined the
elements requisite for the exercise of general jurisdic-
tion-continuous and systematic contacts-and emphasized
the difficulty of proving this standard. 2
Excepting the inconsistent and unpredictable approach to
general jurisdiction outlined by some critics, 3 the judicia-
ry has remained true, by accident or design, to the origi-
nal purposes of general or territorial jurisdiction: endowing
a state with adequate power to control parties within its
borders while preventing encroachment into another state's
jurisdiction."
77. See id. at 411.
78. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
79. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414.
80. See Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447-48.
81. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 418-19.
82. See id. at 415.
83. See Twitchell, supra note 12, at 636-37 (stating that these courts often do not
discuss "whether the defendant's contacts are such that the exercise would be fair
for most causes of action brought by the plaintiff'). General jurisdiction's foremost
goal should be precision in application so that plaintiffs and defendants can deter-
mine fairly whether jurisdiction is available. See id. at 676.
84. See generally Transgrud, supra note 16, at 863 (stating that the courts insti-
tuted limits on personal jurisdiction to protect against the danger of nonreciprocal,
exorbitant theories of state judicial authority).
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Summarizing Specific and General Jurisdiction
As applied, general jurisdiction provides the state with the
authority necessary to control parties that are for all practical
purposes operating within the state, regardless of the cause of
action. This doctrine derives directly from the historical basis of
personal jurisdiction-the power of a state over persons within
its borders. General jurisdiction can thus be viewed as promot-
ing orderly enforcement of a state's laws.
Specific jurisdiction moves beyond presence to analyze wheth-
er the defendant engaged in activity related to the dispute suffi-
cient to overcome his interest in being free from the jurisdiction
of a foreign state's courts. The elements of specific jurisdic-
tion-minimum, purposeful contacts giving rise to the dis-
pute-focus the analysis not on the continuing geographical loca-
tion of the parties, but on the conduct of the defendant."5 Even
if the court determines that the dispute arose within the state's
borders, traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice 6
require that the court consider the defendant's due process
right.' Specific jurisdiction does not reject the original basis for
personal jurisdiction-territorial sovereignty-but it combines
that concept with a due process evaluation focusing on fairness
to the individual.
Because specific jurisdiction looks beyond state borders to the
nature of a dispute and the individual circumstances of a defen-
dant, this doctrine is more easily applied in the context of
Internet contacts, a context often devoid of geographical bound-
aries. On the contrary, general jurisdiction's focus on con-
structive presence within a state's borders does not readily yield
itself to analysis of Internet contacts. Barring an unusual case,
courts should employ a specific jurisdiction framework to evalu-
ate jurisdictional disputes based on Internet contacts. The great-
er flexibility of specific jurisdictional analysis does not solve the
underlying problem of state boundaries, but the focus on defen-
dant conduct allows courts to address the issue directly.
85. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
86. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
87. See supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
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Forum Notice
Presumably, early personal jurisdiction decisions did not ad-
dress whether defendants had to be aware of the forum, be-
cause, much like general jurisdiction, the basis for jurisdiction
was territorial presence. Surely a defendant could be presumed
to know his physical location. If the defendant was unaware,
then it made little difference because the state had absolute ju-
dicial authority over parties within its borders." This source of
jurisdiction gave small quarter to the unwary defendant, but
maintained the absolute legal integrity of a state's boundaries.
Instead of physical location, specific jurisdiction places more
emphasis on the defendant's state of mind. This emphasis is
*evident in the analysis: did the defendant have minimum, pur-
poseful contacts with the forum state, and would exercise of
jurisdiction over the defendant comport with traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice?89 Both of these require-
ments look to the defendant-the degree of purpose in making
the contact and the fairness of exercising jurisdiction over a
party in the defendant's circumstances.' The defendant is the
master of his destiny. Implicit in the term "purposeful" is a
prior awareness of the forum exercising personal jurisdiction.
"Purpose" connotes a conscious intent. A conscious intent to
establish contact with a geographically defined territory de-
mands that the party establishing contact know of his entry9'
into the forum. Awareness of the geographic forum is thus a
prerequisite to the defendant having "connection with the fo-
rum State... such that he... reasonably anticipate[s] being
haled into court there."92
88. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610-11 (1990) (T]he view de-
veloped early that each State had the power to hale before its courts any individual
who could be found within its borders .. .no matter how fleeting his visit.").
89. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (discussing the elements re-
quired to assert specific jurisdiction).
90. See generally Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) ("Jurisdic-
tion is proper.., where the contacts proxinately result from actions by the defen-
dant himself that create a 'substantial connection' with the forum State." (quoting
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957))).
91. Whether the entry is physical, electronic, or constructive.
92. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
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Emphasis on whether the defendant was aware of the forum
was evident in the Supreme Court's recitation of a defendant's
affidavit in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court.3 A cor T
porate officer stated that the defendant company "never contem-
plated that its limited sales of tire valves [to a Taiwanese com-
pany] would subject it to lawsuits in California.' The defen-
dant merely sold component parts to another manufacturer or
entered the parts into the "stream of commerce."95 Regardless
of whether the defendant corporation foresaw the possibility of
the eventual contact with California, the Court determined that
the defendant's actions still would not meet the requirements of
purposeful contact because the foreseeability of being haled into
a California court was not present. 6 The Court thus dismissed
California's claim to jurisdiction over the defendant."
A 1985 case defined the type of awareness that the defendant
must possess before exercising personal jurisdiction. In Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz," the Court upheld Florida's jurisdic-
tion over Rudzewicz, a Michigan resident. The Court relied on
its belief that the defendant "knew that he was affiliating him-
self with an enterprise based primarily in Florida."99 Because
Rudzewicz knew that the plaintiff, Burger King, was a Florida-
based corporation, this satisfied the prerequisite step in estab-
lishing the "purposeful" requirement-forum awareness.' 0 The
opinion went to great lengths to establish Rudzewicz's forum
awareness noting that he sent all official notices and payments
to Florida, that the contract included a Florida choice of law pro-
vision, and that direct negotiations occurred continuously be-
93. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
94. Id. at 107 (quoting the affidavit of the president of the defendant, Asahi) (em-
phasis added).
95. Id. at 105.
96. See i& at 112 (stating that "a defendant's awareness that the stream of com-
merce may or will sweep the product into the forum State does not convert the mere
act of placing the product into the stream [of commerce] into an act purposefully di-
rected toward the forum State") (emphasis added).
97. See id. at 116.
98. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
99. Id. at 480 (emphasis added).
100. See id. at 482.
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tween Rudzewicz and Burger King's Florida headquarters.''
After establishing that Rudzewicz was aware of the connection
with the Florida forum, the Court completed its analysis and
concluded that he could be subject to Florida jurisdiction.0 2
Without evidence that Rudzewicz knew of the significant con-
nection to Florida, the Court likely would have dismissed the
state's jurisdiction just as it did in Asahi.'0 '
In these two noteworthy personal jurisdiction decisions,
Burger King and Asahi, the presence or lack of forum no-
tice determined the Court's outcome. In both cases the
defendant undertook an affirmative act: in Asahi by enter-
ing a product into the stream of commerce and in Burger
King by maintaining business and contractual relationships
through various conduct.'" Because of the affirmative act,
a contact with the forum occurred. Yet, it was still unclear
whether the defendant undertook the affirmative act with
the understanding that the act would result in contact with
the forum attempting to exercise jurisdiction. The answer to
this question hinged on forum notice-whether the defen-
dant was sufficiently aware of the place where the conse-
quences of the affirmative act would manifest. If so, the
affirmative act resulting in the contact could be fairly char-
acterized as purposeful, giving rise to the requisite mini-
mum contacts. If not, then the contact would be merely
incidental, not purposeful, and could not be described as a
minimum contact. Although implicit, the Supreme Court rec-
ognized forum notice as an integral part of the analysis to
determine whether contacts were purposeful. The analysis
focused on evidence of the defendant's knowledge. Regarding
Internet contacts, evidence of forum notice is often difficult
to obtain, and very well may not exist.
101. See id. at 480-81.
102. See id. at 487.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 96-97.
104. See Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 108 (1987);
Burger Ring, 471 U.S. at 479.81.
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A DESCRIPTION OF THE INTERNET
The Internet challenges geographic, territorial-based thinking
because it does not adhere to geographical boundaries." 5 Geo-
graphical ambiguity stems from the removal of time and space
constraints on the user's ability to interact in both personal and
business relationships."6 With a personal computer and a mo-
dem, anyone can access this territorially unbounded region and
thereby access a vast amount of information. 10
7
Internet users often connect to the Internet through service
providers that facilitate connections with the vast array of other
computers linked to the Internet.0 5 Once connected via these
servers, communications are converted into new data formats
and segmented into packets.0 9 These packets, collectively mak-
ing up a single communication, are then transmitted over vari-
ous routes to reach their destination." ° Fundamentally, there
are two parties to every communication, one who initiates and
another who responds.
Although Internet communications often employ telephone
links, unlike a phone call that uses a static, continuous data
link, the Internet employs constantly varying communication
links."' The wide dispersion and rapidly varying communica-
tion links make geographic definition of Internet communica-
tions practically impossible absent deliberate definition by
Internet communicators.1
2
The explosion of this new interactive forum coupled with a
comparatively low level of governance"' produces an unusual
105. See Byassee, supra note 3, at 198-99 (comparing the geography of the United
States with the indistinct boundaries of cyberspace).
106. See id. at 198.
107. See PAUL GILSLER, THE INTERNET NAVIGATOR 2, 22 (1993).
108. See id. at 113.
109. See id. at 15.
110. See id.
111. See Mark Dziatkiewicz, Protocols Take Center Stage as Internet Gains Impor-
tance, AM. NETWORK, Apr. 1, 1996, at 6.
112. See Robert C. Cumbow & Gregory J. Wrenn, Reputation on (the) Line: Defa-
mation and the Internet, CORP. LEGAL TIMEs, Feb. 1996, at 13 (noting that "[o]n
line, anyone can be anywhere").
113. See MTV Networks v. Curry, 867 F. Supp. 202, 203 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (not-
ing that no agency now governs the technical operation of the Internet, but rather, a
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frontier of activity with newly emerging but highly debated legal
guidelines.114 The legal debates center primarily on the appli-
cation of particular laws to cyberspace. 5 One of the most ba-
sic and potentially important issues-personal jurisdiction based
on Internet contacts-only recently began receiving substantial
attention."6 This sudden flurry of attention is due in part to
recent judicial decisions maintaining that jurisdiction may be
based on Internet contacts." 7 The legal press is sounding the
alarm bells properly, but the jurisdictional decisions are by no
means consistent in their outcome or logic.
118
GEOGRAPHICALLY UNDEFINED CONTACTS AND PERSONAL
JURISDICTION
Determining whether to exercise personal jurisdiction over a
party based on geographically undefined contacts is an under-
standably difficult legal chore. Those wishing to expand the
reach of state courts could use the Internet to expand personal
jurisdiction to new limits, but a more cautious and traditional
consensus of several groups leads rather than commands).
114. See Richard S. Zembeck, Note, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Fundamental
Fairness in the Networked World of Cyberspace, 6 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 339, 341
(1996) (observing the public debate over how legal doctrines do and should apply to
cyberspace).
115. See id.
116. Only recently has the press and legal commentary focused on this issue. See
also Zembeck, supra note 114, at 341 (noting that as late as 1996 the issue of
Internet jurisdiction was ignored widely). See generally Cumbow & Wrenn, supra
note 112 (discussing defamation and the Internet); Mark Epstein, Dealing with Ju-
risdictional Issues Presented by the Internet, MULTIMEDIA STRATEGIST, Aug. 1996, at
1; David E. Rovella, Internet Use Can Confer Jurisdiction, NATL L.J., Aug. 12, 1996
(reporting the Sixth Circuites decision in CompuServe v. Patterson).
117. See generally CompuServe v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996) (allowing
personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a copyright dispute involving agreements
accomplished through the Internet); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F.
Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996) (permitting personal jurisdiction over a corporation on the
basis of its Internet and toll-free number advertising that were viewed as directed to
all states).
118. Compare CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1257 (asserting jurisdiction); Inset Sys., 937
F. Supp. at 161 (same); PLUS Sys., Inc. v. New England Network, Inc., 804 F.
Supp. 111 (D. Colo. 1992) (same), with Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F.
Supp. 295, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (rejecting jurisdiction); Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One,
Direct Access, Inc., 636 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (same).
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approach to the Internet and personal jurisdiction would limit
technology's impact on judicial relationships. The historical pur-
poses of limitations on personal jurisdiction-to regulate exorbi-
tant, nonreciprocal exercises of jurisdiction and protect individu-
al interests-are well represented in today's jurisdictional doc-
trine."' Adherence to current doctrines, if clearly defined,
should produce a tenable result allowing the reasonable exercise
of jurisdiction, without turning interstate judicial relationships
on their head. Overly expansive jurisdictional theories that al-
low forums to reach through the Internet, however, could bring
the newly emerging technological society to the brink of unbri-
dled state judicial power. If so, this type of jurisprudence would
represent an abrupt departure from the general trend of courts
when addressing the impact of vehicles that allow broad, geo-
graphically indistinct contacts between interstate actors.
Geographically Undefined Contacts in Non-Internet Contexts
Courts often have rejected personal jurisdiction over activities
that are themselves geographically undefined when analyzing
assertions of specific jurisdiction. Providing "1-800" numbers
to individuals was not considered purposeful availment of a ju-
risdiction.' Courts also have rejected personal jurisdiction
based solely on national magazine advertising because the ad-
vertiser has no control over geographical destination of the mag-
azine." ' Likewise, other nationally distributed advertisements
119. The Court considers the Due Process Clause to be the basis for specific juris-
diction, but federalism concerns are still relevant and an important part of the spe-
cific jurisdiction analysis. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 14, § 3.11, at 133.
The minimum contacts test thus protects both the defendant's liberty interests and
the coequal sovereignty of sister states. See id.
120. For a more complete discussion of courts' treatments of geographically blind
contacts and comparison to Internet contacts, see Zembeck, supra note 114, at 367-
80. Citing Mr. Zembeck, a recent decision analogized an Internet site to a national
magazine and declined to assert jurisdiction based on the clear precedent established
in cases dealing with personal jurisdiction based on contacts with the forum state
through national magazines. See Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, 1997 WL 97097, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997).
121. See Dart Int'l, Inc. v. Interactive Target Sys., Inc., 877 F. Supp. 541, 543-44
(D. Colo. 1995).
122. See id. at 544.
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do not rise to the constitutionally required level of purposeful con-
tact necessary for a forum to exercise personal jurisdiction."
Nationally distributed materials may, however, become "pur-
poseful" if actions are directed toward the forum. For example,
courts consider tortious activity conducted through an otherwise
geographically undefined vehicle, such as a national magazine,
to be an activity directed towards a forum where the damaged
party resides.' The courts also consider mail-order catalog dis-
tribution to be forum-directed because it can be geographically
controlled by the seller." Because courts attribute geographic
awareness and control to these activities, the courts have per-
mitted the exercise of personal jurisdiction over parties engaged
in these activities.
Internet Contacts
The Internet presents a new form of geographically indistinct
contacts. In the abstract, specific jurisdiction is better suited
than general jurisdiction to analyze the exercise of personal ju-
risdiction related to Internet contacts. Courts developed specific
jurisdiction precisely to accommodate nationalized commerce be-
cause the focus centers on the dispute rather than physical pres-
ence in a forum.'26 In disputes arising because of Internet con-
tacts, the location of the parties is unclear and may be of no real
consequence. Instead, the question of what state's laws and
protections were accessed by the parties when the contacts giv-
ing rise to the dispute took place is determinative. Specific juris-
diction accommodates that inquiry by asking whether there was
a purposeful contact giving rise to the dispute.'27 The same
analysis that aided courts in resolving jurisdictional questions
123. See Federated Rural Elec. Ins. Corp. v. Kootenai Elec. Coop., 17 F.3d 1302,
1305 (10th Cir. 1994).
124. See generally Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) (discussing liberalized juris-
dictional analysis invoked by the presence of tortious activity).
125. See Sollinger v. Nasco Int'l, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 1385 (D. Vt. 1987).
126. See Twitchell, supra note 12, at 618-19 (stating that as "interstate commercial
relations grew more extensive in the mid-nineteenth century, the nature of the dis-
pute began to play a more prominent role in both English and American jurisdiction
decisions").
127. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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involving the international stream of commerce,1 8 national
advertising, 29  and national telecommunications 30-- specific
jurisdiction-is the logical choice for analyzing Internet-based
contacts.
General jurisdiction, because it is such a close relative of terri-
torial-based jurisdiction, does not reconcile with geographically
undefined Internet contacts. Based on Helicopteros, a party would
need more substantial transactions in, and visits to, the forum
than those presented in that decision-major helicopter purchas-
es with continuous training in the state-to create general
jurisdiction.' To be continuous and systematic, the contacts
must constitute the maintenance of some portion of the general
business within the forum. 32 Applying this standard to Internet
contacts, both the communications initiator and the responder
should be considered. For practicality's sake, the responder will
be assumed to be an Internet site provider, although this could be
another individual communicating through a site, and the contact
initiator will be assumed to be an individual.
A casual Internet user presumably would not have the type of
continuous and systematic contacts with the forum required un-
der general jurisdiction. Accessing an Internet site on an infre-
quent basis does not- give rise to the type of continuous contact
required. Nor would these contacts be arranged orderly and sys-
tematically. Only a case of frequent and ordered Internet access
to a site could give rise to a claim under general jurisdiction. Al-
though not impossible, this type of relationship presumably
would have to be quite substantial to be worthy of analysis un-
der general jurisdiction. No court has yet attempted to assert
general jurisdiction in this context.
Looking at the other side of an Internet communication, the
128. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
129. See Dart Int'l, Inc. v. Interactive Target Sys., Inc., 877 F. Supp. 541, 543-44
(D. Colo. 1995).
130. See Federated Rural Elec. Ins. Corp. v. Kootenai Elec. Coop., 17 F.3d 1302,
1305 (10th Cir. 1994).
131. See id. (referring to Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437
(1952), as a case in which the court properly exercised general jurisdiction because
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responder, presumed to be an Internet site provider, is also un-
likely to maintain the type of contacts with a state to constitute
an exercise of general jurisdiction. Individual accessors must
undertake affirmative action to initiate contact with an Internet
site. 3' An Internet site stands by passively until it responds to
an outside contact. The Internet site, although continuously ac-
cessible, only sends material into a forum state if accessed by an
individual within the state.134 Contact with the forum, there-
fore, occurs as an automatic, involuntary, responsive action.
Intuitively, an Internet site does not have continuous contacts
with the forum.
The requirement that the contacts be systematic cuts deeper
against the exercise of general jurisdiction over an Internet site
provider. In order to be systematic, the contacts must be in some
sort of orderly arrangement. 3 ' Maintaining a portion of a busi-
ness within a forum satisfies this element because there is an
organized, directed activity within the forum. Possessing
Internet sites that are accessed whimsically through the unilat-
eral action of an Internet user in a particular state does not con-
stitute orderly arranged contacts on the part of the site provider.
If an Internet site provider responded to a user who unilater-
ally initiated interstate access, then that response could hardly
be characterized as continuous and systematic. General jurisdic-
tion, therefore, should not be exercised over a foreign Internet
site provider without a significantly more substantial relation-
ship with the state. That is not to say that such a relationship is
outside of the realm of possibility. Such a relationship might
consist of the presence of facilities or personnel within the state
or other continuing and systematic activities within the state.
The mere maintenance of an Internet site, however, should not
reach this level.
133. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 299 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), affd, 1997 WL 560048 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1997); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction
Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Conn. 1996).
134. Unless, of course, the physical hardware containing the site is itself in the
jurisdiction.
135. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1450 (6th ed. 1990) (defining the root word "sys-
tem" as requiring an "[oirderly combination or arrangement . .. especially such com-
bination according to some rational principle").
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Courts are not likely to end the ritualistic practice of begin-
ning every personal jurisdiction analysis with a recitation of the
general and specific jurisdiction dichotomy when addressing
Internet-based disputes.' Nor should they, but that is as far
as the general jurisdiction analysis should proceed in this con-
text. As the above discussion demonstrated, general jurisdiction
is at best ill-suited for Internet contact analysis.
A Judicial Quagmire
In Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., a Connecticut
court demonstrated the potential danger of an overly expansive
doctrine when it addressed the question of whether a foreign
court could exercise control over -an Internet site provider."3 7
The court answered with an emphatic "yes."3 8 Unfortunately,
the court committed the all too common error explained by Pro-
fessor Twitchell." 9 Rather than basing jurisdiction either on
general or specific jurisdiction, the court analyzed the issue under
an unacceptable hybrid of the two.140 For purposes of this dis-
cussion it will be termed a. general jurisdiction analysis because
the court never specifically addressed whether any harm giving
rise to the action resulted from the alleged contacts.""
The Massachusetts defendant advertised its business over an
Internet site using a domain address that contained the plaintiffs
trademark name.' Because of the apparent trademark in-
136. See Twitchell, supra note 12, at 610 (stating that "lower court judges routinely
begin personal jurisdiction analysis with the incantation that there are two kinds of
jurisdiction, 'general' and 'specific").
137. See Inset Sys., 937 F. Supp. at 165 (describing its review as one of specific
jurisdiction; but as explained in the text that follows, the analysis appeared to strad-
dle the general and specific jurisdiction fence).
138. Id.
139. See Twitchell, supra note 12, at 611-12.
140. See Inset Sys., 937 F. Supp. at 163-66.
141. The court stated that the defendant directed its "advertising activities via the
Internet and its toll-free number toward not only the state of Connecticut, but to all
states." Inset Sys., 937 F. Supp. at 165. The defendant "therefore, purposefully
availed itself of the privilege of doing business within Connecticut." Id. The court did
not establish any relationship between the alleged harm from the trademark in-
fringement and the forum resulting from the Internet contacts. See id.
142. See id. at 163. "Domain addresses are similar to street addresses, in that it is
through this domain address that Internet users find one another." Id.
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fringement, the plaintiff brought suit.' Despite a lack of any
significant business activity in Connecticut,' the court deter-
mined that the defendant's Internet site was enough to assert
jurisdiction not only in Connecticut, but in every state in the
Union, assuming Internet users resided in the state. 45 The omi-
nous conclusion derived from what the court described as pur-
posefully directed advertising activities, occurring on a continuing
basis, that gave rise to a reasonable anticipation of being haled
into the state's courts. 46 In one sense, this terminology sounded
suspiciously like a specific jurisdiction analysis-purposefully di-
rected contacts and foreseeability-but it omitted any discussion
of the contact giving rise to the harm. In another sense, the termi-
nology sounded like an analysis of general jurisdic-
tion-advertising activities occurring on a continuous basis-but
it omitted any discussion of the systematic nature of the
contacts. 47 These inconsistencies produced an unfortunate
blending of the two jurisdictional theories resulting in the court's
conclusion that because a Massachusetts defendant, and presum-
ably any defendant, maintained an Internet presence it could be
subject to jurisdiction in any state with Internet users. 48
The Internet multiplies the threat of not adhering strictly to
the specific jurisdiction analysis. As demonstrated by the Inset
Systems opinion, presence on the Internet would allow any state
to assert jurisdiction over an otherwise unconnected party. This
danger is a classic example of the exception swallowing the
whole. The "exception" is an extension of jurisdiction-based
Internet contacts that are neither continuous and systematic nor
give rise to the dispute. The "whole" is represented by the esti-
mated forty million persons worldwide that can access the
Internet, a number that is expected to grow to 200 million by
the year 1999.49 Under the Inset Systems analysis, any party
143. See id.
144. See id. at 162.
145. See i& at 165.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 143-49.
149. See Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, 1997 WL 97097, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26,
1997).
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maintaining an Internet presence could be sued in any forum.
To date, no personal jurisdiction decision involving Internet
contacts has resolved questions of judicial authority solely under
an analysis of general jurisdiction. Most courts instead have re-
solved the issue of personal jurisdiction through a purely specific
jurisdiction analysis.
Several Internet site accessors have challenged the assertion
of specific jurisdiction by the corresponding site providers. The
most notable case involved an Ohio site provider attempting to
bring suit against a Texas Internet user, Richard Patterson, in
an Ohio federal court.5° This case represented the first step
into the foray by a United States Court of Appeals. The Ohio
plaintiff, CompuServe, a computer information service, filed a
declaratory judgment action against a Texas subscriber and
shareware provider who claimed that CompuServe was engaged
in tradework infringement.' The Sixth Circuit found that
Ohio courts properly could exercise jurisdiction after engaging in
a specific jurisdiction analysis.'52
Early in the opinion, the court recited the elements necessary
to assert personal jurisdiction: purposeful availment of the fo-
rum state by the defendant; a cause of action arising from forum
activities; and substantial contact making the exercise of juris-
diction over the defendant reasonable. 5 Based on Internet
contacts alone, the court determined that Patterson's course of
conduct met these requirements. I"
Patterson purposefully availed himself of the jurisdiction by
entering a written electronic agreement with CompuServe and
later transmitting software via the Internet to the plaintiff.'55
Viewed alone, these contacts seemed removed from Ohio. The
court, however, was careful to characterize the contacts using
terms abundant with Ohio connections. First, the contract con-
tained an Ohio choice-of-law clause. 5 Second, Patterson pur-
150. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
151. See id. at 1260-61.
152. See id. at 1268-69.
153. See id. at 1263.
154. See id. at 1264-69.
155. See id. at 1264.
156. See id.
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posefully agreed to market his software through Ohio-based
CompuServe and transmitted that software to the State.' As
the court stated, "[o]nce Patterson had [subscribed to
CompuServe and entered a 'Shareware Registration
Agreement'], he was on notice that he had made contracts, to be
governed by Ohio law, with an Ohio-based company."'58 All of
Patterson's later contacts were therefore couched in the knowl-
edge that Ohio was the place where the Internet contacts oc-
curred. Once the court established the defendant's prerequisite
forum awareness, the court quickly concluded that Patterson
was subject to Ohio's jurisdiction.
After defining the activities as Ohio based, the court faced no
difficulty justifying the activities giving rise to the dispute as
substantial enough to assert jurisdiction. The contract was not a
"one-shot affair," but rather a continuing marketing relationship
that the plaintiff perpetuated by transmitting numerous soft-
ware programs.'59 The contract agreement itself evidenced a
relationship with the forum, although that was not enough
standing alone.' But, taken together, these contacts exceeded
the amount necessary to exercise jurisdiction. 6' Finally, the
court noted that the contacts resulted in CompuServe's filing of
the action to preserve its multimillion dollar software marketing
business and thus the contact gave rise to the cause of ac-
tion. '6 The satisfaction of this element rounded out the consti-
tutional requirements for asserting personal jurisdiction. The
court concluded, therefore, that the plaintiff could be haled fairly
into court in Ohio."6
Emphasizing the narrowness of the holding, the court re-
served judgment as to whether Internet software sales, the
157. See id.
158. Id. (emphasis added).
159. See id. at 1265.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 1265-66 (comparing these contacts to a single insurance contract, see
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), and making phone calls to
Ohio combined with shipping goods to the state and maintaining distribution facili-
ties in the state, see U.S. Sprint Communications Co. v. Mr. W~s Foods, Inc., 624
N.E.2d 1048 (Ohio 1994)).
162. See id. at 1267.
163. See id. at 1268.
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spread of a computer virus, or nonpayment of subscriber fees
would subject a defendant to personal jurisdiction in the rele-
vant forum. 1" The limited holding, especially in the context of
geographical notice, provides evidence of the Sixth Circuit's
unwillingness to spread personal jurisdiction as wide as the
Internet's web. To its credit, the Sixth Circuit realized the impli-
cation of such a ruling.
The linchpin, of the Sixth Circuit's analysis was Patterson's
knowledge, constructive or imputed, of the Ohio forum. Without
this knowledge, the court would have had difficulty asserting
that the substance of the contacts amounted to purposeful
availment of the jurisdiction. Instead, the court would have been
forced to declare the contacts nonpurposeful and reject jurisdic-
tion just as the Supreme Court did in Asahi.'"
The comparisons between the CompuServe decision and Asahi
are unmistakable. Both decisions revolved around the purposeful
element. 6' In each case, the question was one of whether the
defendant was on notice of the geographic affiliation. In Asahi
the stream of commerce insulated the defendant corporation from
knowledge.'67 In CompuServe, the Internet would have served
the same insulative function, but the defendant's forum notice
was established through substantial evidence.'" If the defen-
dant in Asahi had signed an agreement establishing California
law as governing disputes between the parties and had shipped
products directly to California, then the Court, in all likelihood,
would have found that the defendant purposefully availed itself
of the forum and was subject to its jurisdiction. The single differ-
ence between the cases was the evidence of forum notice present
in CompuServe and absent in Asahi.
In another recent decision, a New York court refused to assert
jurisdiction over a Missouri defendant that maintained an
164. See id.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 93-97.
166. See supra notes 93-97 & 157 and accompanying text. For an application of the
Asahi holding to Internet contacts, see Gwenn M. Kalow, From the Internet to Court:
Exercising Jurisdiction Over World Wide Web Communications, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
2241 (1997).
167. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
168. See CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1264-67.
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Internet site alleged to infringe on a New York party's
trademark."9 Noting the logic used by the Supreme Court in
Asahi, this court concluded that maintaining an Internet site
was like placing a product into the stream of commerce-the
mere foreseeability of the product's entry into a forum did not
constitute purposeful availment. 170 The court contrasted the
CompuServe result by noting that the Texas defendant deliber-
ately reached out, originated, and maintained contacts with a
party that he knew resided in Ohio.'7' The New York court rec-
ognized implicitly the foundation of deliberate or purposeful con-
tact: that the defendant was required to be on notice of the fo-
rum attempting to assert jurisdiction.
In a 1992 decision, a Colorado court exercised personal juris-
diction over a computer services user based on electronic con-
tacts in PLUS System, Inc. v. New England Network, Inc."2
This case involved an ATM network and one of its regional affili-
ates. The Colorado-based plaintiff entered into a contract to
provide computer processing services for the Connecticut-based
defendant using electronic transmission of data. 74 The plain-
tiff, PLUS, sued in Colorado over royalty fees that it attempted
to assess against certain transactions handled under the agree-
ment.76 The defendant, New England Network, initially chal-
lenged the personal jurisdiction of the Colorado court. 6
The logic employed by the court to resolve the personal juris-
diction dispute was strikingly similar to that of the Sixth Circuit
in CompuServe-particularly in the characterization of the
defendant's awareness of forum connections. As in CompuServe,
the contract signed by the defendant contained a choice-of-law
clause naming the forum. 7 In addition to this notice, the New
England Network mailed payments to the forum, and its repre-
169. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996),
aff'd, 1997 WL 560048 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1997).
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. 804 F. Supp. 111 (D. Colo. 1992).
173. See id. at 114.
174. See id. at 118-19.
175. See id. at 115.
176. See id. at 117.
177. See id. at 118.
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sentative personally toured the computer facilities. 7 ' These
factors combined to establish the prerequisite forum notice.
After satisfying that prerequisite, the court faced no real diffi-
culty in characterizing the contacts as purposeful and sufficient
to constitute a valid exercise of personal jurisdiction.'79 Be-
cause New England Network knew where the computer contacts
occurred, the contacts could be characterized as purposeful
availment under the specific jurisdiction analysis.80 Finally,
the court's opinion noted that the dispute arose from the con-
tractual relationship requiring the computer contacts. 8' The
requirements were satisfied, and the court upheld Colorado's
exercise of personal jurisdiction.' 2
Two other decisions that involved specific jurisdiction over com-
puter service accessors rejected the state's authority." In these
cases, just as in those previously discussed, the courts' analyses
keyed on whether the defendant had the requisite forum notice.
Absent this notice, the courts were unwilling to assert jurisdiction
over a defendant based on geographically blind computer contacts,
regardless of the substantiality of the contacts."
The Florida District Court of Appeals rejected jurisdiction over
a New York travel agency that used an airline reservation
service's computer system based in Florida in Pres-Kap, Inc. v.
System One, Direct Access, Inc." The facts of the case were
strikingly similar to those in the Colorado PLUS System
case." In both cases a computer services user accessed hard-
ware located in a different state. In the PLUS System case, the
court upheld jurisdiction, but the Florida court rejected it."7
178. See id.
179. See id. at 119.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 120.
183. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996),
affd, 1997 WL 560048 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1997); Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct
Access, Inc., 636 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
184. See Bensusan Restaurant, 937 F. Supp. at 299-300; Pres.Kap, 636 So. 2d at
1353.
185. 636 So. 2d 1351.
186. See supra notes 172-82 and accompanying text.
187. See supra text accompanying note 172; Pres-Kap, 636 So. 2d at 1353-54.
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The Florida court stated concisely its reason for the rejection:
"There is no showing on this record that the defendant was even
aware of the exact electronic location of the subject computer
database, as this clearly would have been of little importance to
it."" The court noted that the plaintiff managed the relation-
ship from New York and deleted a forum selection clause previ-
ously contained in the contract.19 In contrast to the abundant
opportunities for forum notice in the Colorado PLUS System
decision, the Pres-Kap case highlighted the distinctive lack of
geographic awareness by the defendant party. Expressing the
same caution exhibited by the Sixth Circuit, the Florida court
noted that a contrary decision might improperly subject average
users of on-line computer information to personal jurisdiction in
previously unidentified states."9
Misguided Attempts at Reconciliation
A federal district court in Pennsylvania attempted to reconcile
the apparent disparities noted in many of the above described
decisions in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc.'
The court stated that a review of recent cases dealing with
Internet-based jurisdiction revealed that the exercise of personal
jurisdiction was related directly to the nature and quality of the
commercial activity manifest in the contacts. 92 The court de-
scribed the situations in which this test was most applica-
ble-cases of interactive web sites where a user can exchange
information with the host computer.' 93 The court stated that
cases should be distinguished based upon whether the Internet
contact is a simple informational posting or knowing and repeat-
ed transmission of information over the Internet.' The former
are never grounds for the exercise of personal jurisdiction, and
the latter are always grounds for the exercise of jurisdiction.'95
188. Pres-Kap, 636 So. 2d at 1353 (emphasis added).
189. See id. at 1352-53.
190. See id. at 1353.
191. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
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Despite the lack of any historical precedent for such a test of
commercial activity for the exercise of personal jurisdiction, the
court's result at least seemed proper. The court noted that the
defendant contracted with 3000 residents of the Pennsylvania
forum and entered into contracts with seven Internet access pro-
viders to service Pennsylvania customers.'96 The court also
stated that the defendant knew that these relationships would
result in significant contacts with Pennsylvania, thus establish-
ing the forum notice.'97 The court finished its specific jurisdic-
tion analysis and asserted jurisdiction. Forum notice established
the purposeful element of the analysis. The reason for the
opinion's foray into the novel "commercial activities test" was
unclear, but apparently harmless, at least until another court
followed this reasoning under a set of facts that did not include
evidence of forum notice.
In Resuscitation Technologies, Inc. v. Continental Health Care
Corp.,'98 the contacts between the plaintiff and defendant con-
sisted of an advertisement on an Internet site; eighty electronic
mail messages, faxes, and conference calls; and two meetings,
one in Michigan and one in New York.' An Indiana court
evaluated its ability to exercise jurisdiction under a specific
jurisdiction analysis."0 Despite the almost total lack of contact
with Indiana, the court determined that the state could properly
exercise jurisdiction based on the Zippo analysis of commercial
activities.2"' The court grounded its analysis in terms of eco-
nomic implications for the state of Indiana, the Indiana
plaintiffs impaired financial condition, and policy concerns
about future Indiana residents entering into similar relation-
ships.0 2 Notably absent was any assertion that the defendant
knew that it had entered into a substantial enough relationship
with Indiana to be haled into court there, or that it even knew
the electronic contacts emanated from or were transmitted to
196. See id. at 1126.
197. See id.
198. No. IP 96-1457-C-MIS, 1997 WL 148567 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 24, 1997).
199. See id. at *1-*2.
200. See id. at *3.
201. See id. at *4-*5.
202. See id. at *5.
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Indiana. There was no evidence of forum notice. The contacts,
therefore, between the plaintiff and defendant could not be
deemed a purposeful availment of Indiana by the defendant.
Indiana should not have asserted jurisdiction over the dispute.
The problem with this result should be clear. The Indiana
court allowed the provincial interests of the home state and its
citizens to interfere with the premise that states are coequal
sovereigns, that the courts of one state should not exceed their
bounds to the detriment of another's citizens, and that a state's
courts should not act to provide advantage to its citizens and
interests over another's. Although not an individual, the defen-
dant corporation's interests in being free from improper exercis-
es of jurisdiction unfortunately were ignored. These concerns
were the backbone of the personal jurisdiction exception to the
Full Faith and Credit Clause.0 3
WITH SOME EXCEPTIONS, JUDICIAL DECISIONS COMPORT WITH
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
These cases demonstrate the wisdom of many courts in refus-
ing to apply an improperly liberal general jurisdictional analysis.
The continuous and systematic contacts manifested by carrying
on a portion of an on-going business within a state surpass any
case of Internet activity yet litigated.20 ' Using the facts of the
Helicopteros case as an example, none of these cases demonstrat-
ed Internet contacts that amounted to a closer relationship with
a forum than major helicopter purchases initiated by in-state
negotiations and followed up with large numbers of personnel
being trained in the forum.0 5
By employing a specific jurisdiction analysis instead, courts,
with some exceptions represented by the Connecticut federal
district court in the Inset Systems decision and the Indiana court
in Resuscitation, have avoided exorbitant applications ofjurisdic-
tion. Excepting those few, courts generally have determined that
203. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
204. See Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S.A v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-16
(1984) (describing the threshold requirements to exercise general jurisdiction).
205. See id. at 416 (noting the defendant's various contacts with the forum and
rejecting the exercise of general jurisdiction).
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maintaining an Internet site does not constitute the purposeful
availment of a jurisdiction absent some particular knowledge of
the forum. The maintenance of an Internet site is not in itself
sufficiently directed towards a geographic forum. Although not
yet an area of much litigation, casual accessors of computer sites
are presumably even less likely to be subjected to the authority
of a forum based on computer contacts.
.This trend is in line with the development of personal jurisdic-
tion doctrine. Like many emerging means of communication and
transportation, Internet contacts do not confer the actual or con-
structive presence of an individual within to constitute exercise of
territorial-based jurisdiction. Courts, therefore, should, and for
the most part do, analyze these contacts under the framework
developed for a more mobile society-specific jurisdiction.
Under this analysis, geography is not forgotten, but its signifi-
cance relates not to where a party is located physically, but in-
stead whether the defendant purposefully submitted to the
state's courts. The jurisdictional rub manifests when determin-
ing whether Internet contacts, which have no real geographic
component, can be geographically defined. The only method of
determining whether a party deliberately submitted is to evalu-
ate the contacts between the opposing parties to determine first
whether the defendant was aware of the forum. Specific jurisdic-
tion asks the right question by inquiring about the defendant's
purpose and whether that purpose was sufficient to affiliate
with the state.
THE NEED TO EXPLICITLY RECOGNIZE FORUM NOTICE
In evaluating whether a defendant maintained purposeful
contacts with a state in the context of the Internet, the most
difficult hurdle to cross is forum notice. Notice of this kind has
not received as much attention in previous cases of specific juris-
diction because contacts that were purposeful naturally engen-
dered the notice of the jurisdiction. In cases of other geographic
insulators such as the stream of commerce, "1-800" numbers,
and national advertising, the general trend is to reject jurisdic-
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tion because of the lack of forum notice."'6 Without forum no-
tice, the contacts cannot be considered the kind of purposeful
availment necessary for the exercise of specific jurisdiction.
The concept of forum notice is not new. Because courts began
to focus on the defendant, rather than solely on state borders,
the specific jurisdiction analysis searched for purposeful con-
tacts.0 7 Purposeful and its synonyms: intentional, deliberate,
and willful, all imply a conscious decision on the part of the ac-
tor. In the case of specific jurisdiction, it is purposeful availment
of a forum, the type that would make exercise of jurisdiction
foreseeable, that is required to exercise personal jurisdiction."°
Knowledge of the geographic basis of the contact, therefore, is
a prerequisite to establishing that a contact is purposeful. Pur-
poseful action by the defendant is required before a contact can
be evaluated under specific jurisdiction.0 9 In the context of
geographically blind contacts, such as Internet contacts, estab-
lishing that the defendant was on notice of the forum must be
an explicitly required element.
When courts address a personal jurisdiction dispute that aris-
es through the Internet, a simple addition should be explicitly
made in the requirements for exercising specific jurisdiction:
forum notice. Rather than stating "the defendant must purpose-
fully avail himself of the privilege of acting in the forum
state,"21 this component of specific jurisdiction could be restat-
206. See supra text accompanying notes 120-25 & 166-68.
207. This change in focus occurred in 1945 with the International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), decision by the Supreme Court. Later, in 1958 the
Court announced that minimum contacts referred to purposeful availment of the fo-
rum state. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). Before 1960, the doc-
trine of personal jurisdiction established the idea of minimum, purposeful contacts.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56; see also Johnson & Post, supra note
3, at 1370 (describing territorial boundaries as serving a "signpost function," capable
of providing notice). The authors also noted that these boundaries are one of the
reasons that geographic borders make sense:
Notice. Physical boundaries are also appropriate for the delineation of
"law space" in the physical world because they can give notice that the
rules change when the boundaries are crossed. Proper boundaries have
signposts that provide warning that we will be required, after crossing, to
abide by different rules, and physical boundaries-lines on the geograph-
ical map-are generally well-equipped to serve this signpost function.
Id.
209. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
210. CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1263 (6th Cir. 1996) (describing
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ed as: The defendant must be on sufficient notice of the forum
state when engaging in the contacts to constitute purposeful
availment of the state. A simple amendment, but quite useful.
For most courts evaluating personal jurisdiction, addressing
forum notice explicitly will require little change in their ap-
proach. Many courts already actively search for the defendant's
awareness of the geographic forum.21' Adding forum notice as
an element of the analysis will simply promote a bright-line rule
in an area of much confusion.
Adding further definition to the specific jurisdiction rule will
aid in accomplishing several useful goals. First, it will ensure
that Internet-based jurisdiction is not the instrument of fraud
and oppression. Second, it will maintain the balance of state ju-
dicial power. Third, the added certainty will reduce the fear as-
sociated with engaging in commercial and personal activities
through the Internet.212 This rule will thus promote both state
and individual interests. Internet-based jurisdiction is ripe for
abuse in the same way that overly permissive notice laws were
abused in Pennoyer v. Neff 21 and more recently sham induce-
ments into the forum. 14
In 1877, the danger of overly expansive state jurisdiction ar-
rived in the form of oppressive legislation.215 The same fears of
fraud and oppression support the limits on Internet-based juris-
diction. Today, the danger of fraud and oppression proceeds from
the exorbitant reach of state courts based merely on an Internet
211presence. 6 The danger of this action was the same, in
1813,217 as it was in 1877, and as it is today.
The policy behind prohibiting sham inducements into a juris-
diction also supports the requirement of forum notice. Both are
bright-line rules and promote open communications between
the elements necessary for the exercise of specific jurisdiction).
211. See supra text accompanying notes 179-80 & 196-97.
212. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 14, § 3.11, at 134-35 (recognizing that the
recent judicial trend is to inject predictability and certainty into the minimum con-
tacts test).
213. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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parties. In the case of sham inducement, the fear of being fooled
into entering a jurisdiction could lead to a reduction in settlement
negotiations between feuding parties.218 In the case of Internet
communications, commerce faces one of its most promising vehi-
cles in many years. Rather than putting users in fear of being
haled into a state court where the user has no known contact, the
judiciary should provide comfort by reassuring Internet site pro-
viders and accessors that they will not be subject to jurisdiction
absent forum notice. This action will not only provide psychologi-
cal comfort but will also reduce the costs of doing business, which
are of special concern to Internet entrepreneurs.
Internet users that want to establish a basis for jurisdiction
should ensure that the foundation is laid for establishing pur-
poseful contacts. Courts have placed particular reliance on two
methods of establishing proper forum notice: a forum selection
clause or choice-of-law clause in a contractual relationship estab-
lished on the Internet."9 Although not previously used, possi-
bly because Internet users remain unaware of the need to estab-
lish forum notice, parties using the Internet could prominently
display their location, thus conveying specific forum notice. The
accessor is then forced to submit to a state's jurisdiction by en-
tering the forum electronically. Once the forum notice is estab-
lished, and the Internet is reduced to a geographic reality,
courts can follow a traditional specific jurisdiction test to deter-
mine if the contacts were purposeful, whether the contact gave
rise to the dispute, and whether the exercise of jurisdiction
would comport with traditional notions of fair play and substan-
tial justice.
CONCLUSION
Through the exercise of judicial restraint, courts can comply
with the historical purposes behind doctrines of personal juris-
218. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
219. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit relied on two forum
selection clauses. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1260 (6th Cir.
1996). The United States District Court for the District of Colorado also relied in
part on a forum selection clause. See PLUS Sys., Inc. v. New England Network, Inc.,
804 F. Supp. 111, 118 (D. Colo. 1992).
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diction and provide states and individuals with a workable stan-
dard. Individuals lacking knowledge of the basis for jurisdiction-
al contacts will be free from litigating in unanticipated foreign
courts. This reduces the fear that the unrestrained exercise of
personal jurisdiction by courts will be the instrument of fraud
and oppression." The interests of the several states will be
protected by endowing them with adequate judicial power and
freeing them from foreign states interfering in domestic affairs,
thus preserving one of the oldest purposes of limits on personal
jurisdiction. As with any bright-line rule, requiring forum notice
also will increase judicial efficiency.
Average Internet users should take comfort in a judiciary that
adheres to doctrines of personal jurisdiction that comport with
historical limits. Casual users of the Internet that access inter-
state Internet sites will almost certainly not risk foreign juris-
diction. Internet site providers should not be subjected to juris-
diction in other forums based solely on an Internet site accessi-
ble by users of other jurisdictions.
The historical rationale for limiting jurisdiction must be pre-
served even in the face of an onslaught of globe shrinking tech-
nology. Recognizing the trend of relaxing the limits on personal
jurisdiction, Chief Justice Earl Warren warned:
[Ilt is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the even-
tual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of
state courts.... [Those restrictions] are a consequence of the
territorial limitations on the power of the respective states.
However minimal the burden of defending in a foreign tribu-
nal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so unless he
has 'minimum contacts'.... 22'
This acknowledgment embraces the challenge that courts face
today--ensuring that the states maintain adequate territorial
power while freeing defendants from the exorbitant,
unreciprocated reach of courts. In the face of an ever-expanding
Internet, the threat to jurisdictional limitations and the need to
220. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
221. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
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protect these limitations has never been greater. Internet con-
tacts that could foreseeably touch every citizen could easily turn
into the exception that swallows the doctrine. If courts allow the
Internet to reverse 200 years of judicial precedent and legisla-
tion, then the Wild West of cyberspace instead of law will rule
the relationships between states and individuals.
Darren L. McCarty
